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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent electrophysiological data inspired the claimthat dopaminergic neurons adapt their 
mismatch sensitivities to reflect variances of expected rewards. This contradicts reward 
prediction error theory and most basal ganglia models. Application of learning principles 
points to a testable alternative interpretation – of the same data – that is compatible with 
existing theory. 
Recently, Tobler et al.[1] investigated the quantitative behavior of dopamine (DA) neurons
when events mismatch monkeys’ learned cue-reward expectations. On each training trial of the
learning phase, one of three easily discriminated cues was followed at p = 0.5 by no reward or
at p = 0.5 by a reward magnitude (|R| = 0.05, 0.15 or 0.50 ml of juice) that was unique for
that cue. After training, a larger-than-expected reward (given the cue just presented) elicited a
phasic DAergic (dopaminergic) activation, and a smaller one, a phasic suppression. Remarkably,
the magnitude of this activation or suppression was reported to be identical in all cases, despite
over a 10-fold variation in the difference between the actual (|R| = 0.05, 0.15 or 0.50 ml) and
the expected reward magnitude (Rˆ = p × |R| = 0.025, 0.075 or 0.25; see insets in figure 1 and
figures 4A and 4B of Tobler et al.[1]). Tobler et al.[1] concluded that the sensitivity of DAergic
neurons to the difference is not constant, but rather adapts to the variance in cued outcomes. This
interpretation has flourished in recent reviews[2, 3].
However, this interpretation is not compatible with the reward prediction error (RPE) theory
of DA[3, 4]. According to RPE theory, phasic DAergic signals in response to primary rewards
act as reinforcement signals, the responses of DAergic neurons are proportional to the size of an
uncued primary reward[3] (also see Tobler et al.[1], Figures 1 and 3), and this DAergic response
to primary reward is precisely negated after learning when p(reward|cue) = 1, such that neither
a phasic activation nor a suppression occurs in response to a fully predicted reward[4, 5]. The
crux is this: How could the excitation responsible for the post-reward DAergic burst be precisely
negated when the reward is expected, regardless of the reward magnitude (as postulated by RPE
theory and confirmed by data), if bursts induced by such excitation were always the same size
(as observed under the conditions of Tobler et al.[1]) when a received reward deviates from the
expected? No computational model of DAergic signal genesis offers a satisfactory answer to this
question. Furthermore, most recent basal ganglia models[4, 5, 6, 7, 8] rely on RPEs, in the form of
scaled DA signals, for learning. A proof that the sensitivity of DAergic responses to the deviation
from expected reward adapts would disconfirm such basal ganglia models. Thus, Tobler et al.’s[1]
interpretation of their data is incompatible with RPE theory and most extant BG models. Next, we
offer a mathematically explicit alternative interpretation for Tobler et al.’s[1] data, and show that it
reconciles data, theory and models.
Because of DA neurons’ low basal firing rates in vivo[3], the range of negative RPEs (dips be-
low baseline) after omissions of expected rewards of different magnitudes is severely compressed
[9, 10] relative to the range of positive RPEs (bursts above baseline) after larger than expected re-
wards. We now consider the implications of this pronounced asymmetry within a generic RPE
model in which the excitation of DA neurons that is induced by primary reward is gradually
negated by learned, cue-specific inhibition[4, 5] of DA neurons. The rate of learning and asymp-
totic value of this cue-specific inhibition depends on DA burst and dip magnitudes: each positive
RPE (full-range burst signal) during training potentiates this inhibition, while each negative RPE
(compressed-range dip signal) depresses it[6, 7, 11].
For a training schedule with cue-reward probability p, assume a reward magnitude |R|. Through-
out learning, direct excitation of DA neurons by primary reward will be e ∝ |R|. However, cue-
specific learned inhibition (s) will equal the accumulated changes over N trials due to positive
(∆+) and negative (∆−) RPEs:
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s =
N∫
0
∆+ −
N∫
0
∆− (1)
The positive (∆+)s are initially proportional to reward magnitude, but diminish in absolute
value as learning progresses. The cue-specific value at which s equilibrates depends not only
on reward magnitude but also the mix of positive and negative RPEs, set by p(reward|cue). If
p = 1.0, then there are no negative RPEs, and abundant data indicate that s equilibrates such that
s = e: DA neurons show no deflection from baseline if the cue predicts reward with p = 1.0. Now
consider the case in which p = .5. Half the trials induce negative RPEs. However, because of the
asymmetry noted above, these negative RPEs, and the decrements of learned inhibition that they
induce, can be regarded as of a constant size, independent of reward magnitude. This implies that
the inhibitory signal s will equilibrate at e − f(1 − p)C, that is, at its asymptotic value e (when
there are no negative RPEs) minus a constant, C, times a scaling factor, f(1− p), that grows with
the ratio of negative to positive RPEs, i.e., is an inverse function of p(reward|cue). Thus
s =
N∫
0
∆+ −
N∫
0
∆− = e− f(1− p)C (2)
After learning, the net DA neuron response to any primary-reward induced excitatory input e
and any predictive-cue induced inhibitory input s, for any probability p, can be approximated by
the difference or RPE, ∆D,
∆D ≃ e− s = e− (e− f(1− p)C) = f(1− p)C (3)
Thus, after learning, phasic DAergic responses to cued delivery of the trained primary re-
ward will be constant irrespective of the reward magnitude, and the constant will scale inversely
with p(reward|cue). Indeed, recent simulations of a learning-capable local circuit model (Tan
and Bullock, in prep.) showed that given the learning and computational principles underlying
the above approximation, Tobler et al.’s[1] data are fully compatible with RPE theory and recent
computational models of the basal ganglia (Figure 1). Note that if a larger reward of magnitude
|R2| = β|R| is delivered after training with the reward magnitude |R|, the phasic DA response
∆D ∼ β|R| − (|R| − f(1 − p)C) = (β − 1)|R| + f(1 − p)C will reflect the deviation from the
predicted outcome.
We therefore predict that further analyses and experiments will reveal that what Tobler et al.[1]
observed is not an adaptation of DA neurons’ sensitivities to differences. Rather, their observation
is more likely to be an emergent property of the adaptive neural circuit that governs the magnitudes
of the excitatory and inhibitory inputs that generate phasic DA responses. Our interpretation makes
the following testable prediction: after learning, whereas the DA response to conditioned stimuli
reflects expected reward value[1], post-reward residual DA activation monotonically reflects the
probability (1− p) of non-reward in the training schedule.
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Figure 1: Apparent adaptation of dopamine neuron sensitivities: Data and Simulation. The data
insets (reprinted with permission from Tobler et al.[1]) for monkeys A and B are plots of me-
dian activation levels (above baseline) of dopamine neurons in response to a primary juice reward
that was delivered after a cue that reliably predicted its magnitude. The median activation levels
have been normalized to the median level of activation in response to uncued delivery of a .15
ml reward. That all activation levels are less than 1.0 implies that learning has been sufficient
for cue-dependent "canceling" of much of the activation that would otherwise be induced by the
primary rewards. Each line connects a point corresponding to a near-zero activation, in response
to non-reward, to a second point corresponding to activation in response to one of three larger re-
wards of .05, .15, or .5 ml. The small post-learning variance of the phasic activations induced by
widely different reward magnitudes, and the lines’ slopes’ inverse relation to the size of the larger
of the two reward magnitudes involved, were interpreted by Tobler et al.[1] to imply that learn-
ing had adapted (reduced) dopamine neuron sensitivity in proportion to the variance of the reward
signaled by a given cue. However, the main plot shows that the same properties (small activation
variance with large slope variations) arise in a computational model (Tan and Bullock, in prep.) in
which dopamine neuron sensitivity to differences remains constant during learning – as required
to compute reward prediction errors.
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